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Commentary: Why We Need to Stop Fining Big 
Banks Like Wells Fargo 
By Mehrsa Baradaran                    Originally Published in Fortune on April 23, 2018. 
Wells Fargo settled with U.S. regulators last week, agreeing to pay a $1 billion fine for 
harming customers by creating fake accounts, selling unlawful insurance products, and 
charging unnecessary fees. 
The bank didn’t have to suffer through a trial. The worst public shaming came, perhaps, 
when President Donald Trump called it out on Twitter. Public scrutiny did lead to the 
resignation of CEO John Stumpf and a few members of the board, but no one went to 
jail or lost their shirts. Given how profitable other banks have been after they’ve been hit 
with similar fees, it’s likely Wells Fargo will bounce back from this soon. 
 
When big banks behave badly, they know that the worst thing they’ll get is a fine; no one 
is going to end up in jail. Instead, shareholders end up paying the cost, not the bank 
employees responsible. Shareholders are a diffuse group of investors, many of whom 
hold shares as a part of a diverse portfolio. They are not the ones who commit such 
fraud, nor do they have much power to change the bank’s day-to-day operations. 
Clearly fines don’t work to prevent misconduct. We should instead rely on the 
constitutional method of dealing with wrongdoing: the criminal justice system. This 
involves a court hearing, a public airing of evidence, and neutral decision making. When 
settlements and fines take the place of trials, banks avoid weeks of testimony and the 
forced disclosure of documents. That prevents public and bank regulators from 
understanding exactly what went on and whether other laws were broken. 
Banks and bankers hardly ever go through this process. Since the 2000 Enron scandal, 
no large bank has been prosecuted by the Justice Department for financial crimes (and 
no big bank executives have gone to prison). 
Fines can deter bad behavior, but there’s something about the fear of prison and 
bankruptcy that serves as an excellent reminder to follow the rules. 
Banks and bankers, therefore, must be prosecuted and punished through the same legal 
process as everyone else. Along those lines, Sen. Elizabeth Warren recently introduced 
the Ending Too Big to Jail Act, which would create a permanent law enforcement unit to 
investigate crimes at financial institutions and require executives at big banks to take on 
some of the responsibility of rooting out criminal conduct. This seems like a much-
needed balance in the scales of justice. Hopefully other legislators will take on the cause. 
We who advocate for harsher penalties for banks are not seeking vengeance, nor do we 
delight in the suffering of bankers. In fact, I believe that the majority of bankers are 
good and honest people. The point of harsher penalties is to send a clear message to bad 
actors that their fraud will not be tolerated. If that message had been sent clearly after 
the 2007–08 financial crisis, perhaps Wells Fargo would not have so spectacularly 
scammed its customers. 
Mehrsa Baradaran is an associate dean and J. Alton Hosch associate professor of law 
at the University of Georgia School of Law, and author of How the Other Half Banks 
and The Color of Money. 
 
 
